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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                   
_____________ 
 
No. 07-3518 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
       v. 
 
CHARLES F. MURRAY 
 
Charles Murray, 
               Appellant 
_____________ 
                                                                                         
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 04-cr-00666 
District Judge: The Honorable Bruce W. Kauffman                                       
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 15, 2012 
 
Before: SMITH, FISHER, and GARTH, Circuit Judges  
 
(Filed:    May 21, 2012) 
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
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 Charles Murray pled guilty to one count of possession of child pornography 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).  Murray petitions for relief under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255, arguing in part that he was deprived of his right to counsel on direct 
appeal following his guilty plea.  The District Court dismissed Murray’s petition.  
We conclude that Murray waived his right to raise his deprivation of counsel 
claim; we will thus affirm. 
I 
 On October 13, 2004, Murray was charged by information with one count of 
possession of child pornography.  Murray entered into a plea agreement with the 
Government, and pled guilty to the single count information.  As part of the plea 
agreement, Murray agreed to: 
voluntarily and expressly waive[ ] all rights to appeal or collaterally 
attack [his] conviction, sentence, or any other matter relating to this 
prosecution, whether such a right to appeal or collateral attack arises 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, or any 
other provision of law. 
 
Supp. App’x 35-36 [the “Waiver”].  The plea agreement did permit Murray to 
appeal three discrete issues: 
If the government does not appeal, then notwithstanding the waiver 
provision set forth above, the defendant may file a direct appeal but 
may raise only claims that: 
 
1. the defendant’s sentence exceeds the statutory 
maximum; 
 
2. the sentencing judge erroneously departed upward 
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from the otherwise applicable sentencing guideline 
range; or 
 
3. the court used an incorrect standard of proof in 
making factual determinations necessary to 
sentencing and in doing so prejudiced the 
defendant. 
 
If the defendant does appeal pursuant to this paragraph, no issue may 
be presented by the defendant on appeal other than those described in 
this paragraph. 
 
Id. at 36. 
 On November 5, 2005, the District Court conducted a plea colloquy.  At the 
plea colloquy, Murray was represented by counsel (“plea counsel”).  The court 
reviewed the plea agreement with Murray, and inquired into whether Murray was 
entering his plea knowingly and voluntarily.  The District Court also specifically 
referenced the Waiver.  Id. at 21, 23-24.  Murray confirmed that he understood the 
Waiver, and that he still wished to plead guilty.  The District Court accepted 
Murray’s plea.   
On February 24, 2005, the District Court sentenced Murray to 40 months’ 
imprisonment, with 12 months to be served consecutively to his pending sentence 
from a related case in the District of New Jersey.  The District Court also 
sentenced Murray to three years supervised release, ordered a fine of $1000, and 
ordered a special assessment of $100.  At Murray’s sentencing hearing, the District 
Court informed Murray that any appeal must be filed within ten days of the 
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hearing.  The court also advised Murray that he had a right to counsel on appeal, 
and that if he could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed to represent 
him. 
  On March 9, 2005, Murray filed a timely pro se notice of appeal.  On April 
11, 2005, the Government moved in this court to enforce the Waiver and dismiss 
Murray’s direct appeal.  Plea counsel did not respond to the Government’s motion.  
On April 18, 2005, Murray filed a financial affidavit in this court and moved for 
appointment of counsel for his direct appeal.  On May 27, 2005, we granted the 
Government’s motion to enforce the Waiver, and dismissed Murray’s direct 
appeal.  We did not rule on Murray’s motion for appointment of counsel. 
 On June 19, 2006, Murray filed a pro se petition for habeas relief under 
§ 2255.  The majority of Murray’s petition asserted claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel regarding plea counsel’s performance leading up to and following his 
guilty plea.  In the memorandum of law filed in support of Murray’s petition, 
however, Murray also claimed that he was denied his right to effective assistance 
of counsel when counsel was not appointed on direct appeal.1
                                                 
1 Murray argues that he was deprived of his right to counsel on direct appeal.  As 
the Government notes, however, plea counsel continued to represent Murray while 
Murray filed his pro se  notice of appeal.  See 3rd Cir. LAR 109.1 (2011) (“Trial 
counsel in criminal cases, whether retained or appointed, are expected to continue 
on appeal absent extraordinary circumstances.”); Supp. App’x 134.  As such, his 
claim is better characterized as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
implicating plea counsel’s performance in the course of his direct appeal.  
  On December 13, 
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2006, Murray moved for appointment of counsel concerning his pending § 2255 
petition.  The District Court granted this motion and appointed counsel.   
 On April 11, 2007, the District Court held an evidentiary hearing on 
Murray’s petition.  The evidentiary hearing focused almost exclusively on the 
performance of his counsel leading up to Murray’s guilty plea.  At the hearing, 
plea counsel testified that he specifically discussed with Murray the possibility of 
moving to suppress evidence.  Murray’s counsel at the evidentiary hearing 
affirmed that Murray himself “made the decision not to raise the issue” before the 
District Court.  Supp. App’x 81. 
 On August 13, 2007, the District Court dismissed Murray’s § 2255 petition, 
concluding that Murray had failed to show that plea counsel was ineffective for 
failing to inform him that he might be able to suppress certain evidence the 
Government had collected.  The District Court acknowledged the Waiver, but 
noted that it could not enforce such a waiver if the waiver was not entered into 
knowingly and voluntarily and instead proceeded to consider the merits of 
Murray’s ineffective assistance of plea counsel claim.  The District Court did not 
                                                                                                                                                             
Regardless, because we conclude that Murray has knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his claim, and that such waiver would not effect a miscarriage of justice, 
this distinction is irrelevant to our analysis. 
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address Murray’s claims concerning his right to counsel on direct appeal.  This 
appeal followed.2
II 
 
 Before considering the merits of Murray’s claim, we must consider whether 
the Waiver bars this claim.  United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 241 (3d Cir. 
2008) (noting that the effectiveness of a collateral-attack waiver is a “threshold 
issue”).  There are two situations in which Murray might be allowed to maintain 
his claim:  (1) if the Waiver was not knowing and voluntary; and (2) if enforcing 
the Waiver would “work a miscarriage of justice.”  Id.  We review de novo.  
United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 560 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 First, we agree with the District Court that Murray’s waiver was knowing 
and voluntary.  Murray acknowledges that the District Court and plea counsel 
discussed the Waiver with him, and that he understood its terms.  Murray argues 
that the Waiver was nonetheless not knowing and voluntary due to plea counsel’s 
alleged ineffective assistance in failing to inform him that certain evidence against 
him might be suppressed.  The District Court correctly concluded that Murray 
failed to show that plea counsel was ineffective.  See Strickland v. Washington, 
                                                 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction over Murray’s petition under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253.  Accord United 
States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that “this court retains 
subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal by a defendant who had signed an 
appellate waiver”). 
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466 U.S. 668 (1984).  As a result, Murray has failed to show that the Waiver was 
not knowing and voluntary. 
 Second, we conclude that enforcing Murray’s waiver would not effect a 
miscarriage of justice.  We have held that “[e]nforcing a collateral-attack waiver 
where constitutionally deficient lawyering prevented [the Defendant] . . . from 
filing a direct appeal as permitted by his plea agreement would result in a 
miscarriage of justice.”  United States v. Shedrick, 493 F.3d 292, 298 (3d Cir. 
2007) (emphasis added).  Murray’s plea agreement allowed him to raise three 
specific arguments on direct appeal, all dealing exclusively with sentencing.  
Murray has not claimed that he wished to appeal his sentence on any of these three 
grounds “permitted by his plea agreement.” 3
                                                                                                                                                             
 
  Shedrick, 493 F.3d at 298.  Rather, 
as in Mabry, Murray “has not identified any nonfrivolous ground, not covered by 
the waiver, for a direct appeal or collateral attack in his petition, . . . his counseled 
brief, or any other filing.”  Mabry, 536 F.3d at 243.  Instead, “[t]he issues [Murray] 
seeks to raise on appeal are insubstantial and clearly encompassed by the broad 
waiver.”  Id.  Thus, as in Mabry, we conclude that enforcing the Waiver would not 
3 Murray’s brief in this court, as well as his papers filed in the District Court, only 
suggest that Murray intended to raise his ineffective assistance of plea counsel 
claim on direct appeal.  To the extent that Murray sought a direct appeal on this 
basis, we note that “we ordinarily do not address ineffective-assistance arguments 
on direct appeal, especially where, as here, the factual basis for the claims is not 
well developed.”  United States v. Duka, 671 F.3d 329, 353 n.18 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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effect a miscarriage of justice. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Murray has waived his claim.4
 
  
We will affirm. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
4 Our certificate of appealability directed the parties to focus on three issues:  (1) 
the impact of the Waiver on Murray’s claim concerning his right to effective 
assistance of counsel on direct appeal; (2) whether a § 2255 petition is the proper 
vehicle for such a claim; and (3) whether Murray’s rights were, in fact, violated by 
a denial of his right to effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.  In light of 
our conclusion concerning the first issue, we do not reach the second and third 
issues raised in our certificate.  Mabry, 536 F.3d at 242 (holding that “the validity 
of [a] collateral waiver [is] a threshold issue . . . .”). 
